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Staff Ride to Jena/Auerstadt Battlefield

Stephen L. Bowman

In 1806 one of Napoleon Bonaparte's greatest campaigns resulted in the complete destruction of the Prussian Army. Frederick the Great's creation, so successful for fighting in the age of limited, linear warfare, was crushed by the emotional, patriotic mass army of the French Revolution, led by proven tactical commanders under the command and control of that brilliant rising star, Napoleon.

The opening of the eastern states as a result of German unification makes the twin battlefields of Jena and Auerstadt (Auerstedt on newer maps) easily accessible. The U.S. Army Berlin Brigade chose to use these sites for a staff ride for its commanders and field grade officers.

While assigned to the Berlin Brigade, the author had conducted a reconnaissance of the battlefield for a future staff ride. In April 1992 the Berlin Brigade scheduled a staff ride to Jena/Auerstadt and invited the author to lead it. The organizers issued a read-ahead packet, enabling all participants to have an understanding of the battle. Both 1:50,000 topographical maps and copies of tactical maps or illustrations, showing relative positions during various stages of the battle, were included. In addition, specific topics were assigned to groups of officers, requiring them to read and research in more depth so that they could make presentations in the field on certain aspects of the battle.

The command historian, the project officer, and the staff ride leader then conducted a detailed reconnaissance of the specific points the staff ride would visit. To assist in this effort, a local German historian agreed to accompany the group for both the reconnaissance and the staff ride itself, adding the advantage of his personal knowledge of the battlefield, the area as a whole, and such amenities as good eating spots.

In final preparation for the staff ride, all participants came together for a class that set forth the differences between the French and Prussian armies, strategies, tactics, logistics, etc. The class addressed the campaign from the strategic and operational levels, with tactical discussions left to be completed on the battlefield. The group moved by bus to Jena, arriving in late evening to ensure a fresh, early start the next day. Since unification, Jena has already begun to grow and modernize, so a comfortable hotel was available to the group.

Day one of the staff ride followed the approach march of the French army. Marshal Jean Lannes' V Corps moved through Jena and seized the heights of the Landgrafenberg to allow space for the French army to deploy for battle, although Napoleon did not plan to fight for another two days. The terrain clearly reveals the significance of the Prussian decision not to defend the Landgrafenberg, thus allowing the French to gain the difficult high ground uncontested. Napoleon's operational concept for concentrating his corps proved to make excellent sense when seen in terms of the actual terrain.

Staff ride participants were able to observe the significance of the initial fighting for the towns of Cospeda, Lutzroda, and Closewitz that allowed the French to mass significant combat power and caused the Prussian commander, the Prince von Hohenlohe, to decide to stand and fight, although his mission was to screen the withdrawal of the main Prussian army.

In the vicinity of the town of Vierzehnheiligen, the armies locked into combat—before Napoleon desired, thanks to the impetuosity of Marshal Michel Ney. It was here that the well-drilled Prussian troops executed their linear formations with great precision and discipline, aligning themselves perfectly, then halting outside the village to deliver the volley fire that Frederick the Great's armies had so often used to blast holes in the lines of their foes. But the French did not play by those rules. Employing large numbers of skirmishers and a massed artillery battery (Napoleon's first use of what would become a standard tactic), the French inflicted massive casualties on the Prussian lines, which continued to close ranks as soon as a man fell.

Napoleon had positioned himself on a hill to the

rear of Vierzehnheiligen and gathered the commanders of his increasing reserves around him. Standing in that location, the staff ride participants could see exactly what Napoleon saw as he waited for the critical moment to unleash his massed forces to break and overrun the ever-dwindling Prussian units.

The local historian was extremely interested in how U.S. battlefields are "packaged" so that the events can be clearly understood by visiting tourists. After several Civil War battlefields were described to him, he started planning how to improve the Jena/Auerstadt battlefield so that it would be easier to understand and to picture what happened during the various phases of the battle. As an example, he later stated that there would be a large map painted on the side of a small building near Napoleon's command post that would show the events occurring to the front of that location.

After lunch at a *Gasthaus* located within the confines of the Jena battlefield, the staff ride group followed the route of the fleeing Prussians and the exploiting French. Then the group moved to the location where Prussian General Ernst Rüchel had moved his reinforcing "army" of about 20,000 men—too late to impact on the main fight and in poor position to halt the French exploitation and allow the Prussian forces to rally. The group ended the first day by visiting several sites where individual Prussian and Saxon units had fought particularly well as they retreated, allowing the group to observe the terrain and to analyze and discuss why units were successful or why they failed.

Day two of the staff ride followed the route of Marshal Louis-Nicolas Davout's III Corps as it marched through Jena and north to Naumburg. There Davout received orders to conduct an envelopment of what Napoleon thought was the main Prussian force at Jena. Davout was to envelop the Prussians and cut off any retreat so that Napoleon could complete his battle of annihilation.

Moving from Davout's bivouac sites in Naumburg, the staff ride group moved across the Saale River and up the steep ridge coming out of the Saale valley. The group was able to see where, in the fog, Davout's advance guard stumbled into part of the main Prussian army moving away from Jena. At the small village of Hassenhausen, the group moved along the positions hastily occupied by the French as Prussian General G. L. Blücher von Wahlstatt launched his initial hasty—and unsupported—cavalry attack against the French right flank. By seeing the terrain from both the French and Prussian viewpoints, participants were able to get a feeling of the intensity of the fighting and the difficulties both sides faced. The Prussians launched a series

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of piecemeal attacks as units came forward against the badly outnumbered French troops. The Berlin Brigade officers were able to locate the decision points from both the Prussian and French perspectives. They could see where the Duke of Brunswick, the Prussian army commander, fell mortally wounded from a musket ball through the eye (while leading a *battalion* into the fight), then better understand the lack of leadership which caused the Prussians to squander their final chance for victory by dividing the last reinforcing division against *both* French flanks, instead of massing on one or the other flank and overwhelming the badly weakened French corps.

So, too, could the staff ride personnel understand how Marshal Davout decided to go over to the attack, demoralizing the Prussians in the face of their already heavy losses. The staff ride followed the route of the exhausted Prussians, pushed by the equally exhausted French infantry (Davout having little cavalry at the beginning of the battle and much less by the end).

The staff ride itself ended at the long ridge overlooking Eckartsberge and the Unstrut River valley, where Davout halted his troops, resupplied them, and prepared them, as part of the entire *Grande Armee*, for the pursuit which began the next day. This classic pursuit ended at the Baltic Sea with the complete capitulation of the Prussian Army. Thus ended the campaign of 1806, one of the most significant campaigns in military history because of the Prussian reform movement that immediately began trying to make changes necessary to bring Prussia once again to a position of military prominence. The reforms that Gerhard J. D. von Scharnhorst, Count Neidhardt von Gneisenau, Karl von Clausewitz, et al., brought to the Prussian Army resulted in the formation of what became known as the Great German General Staff and changed the face of warfare in the modern age.

The staff ride group ate lunch on the edge of the battlefield, then drove the short distance to Weimar. Passing through the extensive casernes and training areas formerly occupied by a Soviet army headquarters and two divisions, the group drove to the former Nazi concentration camp at Buchenwald. The camp is now a museum to the Holocaust victims and brought to life the horrors of that period in the two hours the group spent there before returning to home station.

A staff ride to Jena/Auerstadt offers some tremendous learning opportunities for professional officers. One of the unique aspects of visiting this battlefield, as opposed to World War I or World War II sites, is that the officers are able to consider the strategic, opera-

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tional and tactical perspectives as they combine at this single locale. How strategic- and operational-level decisions impacted on tactical operations becomes readily apparent as the staff ride moves over the terrain. This is a superb opportunity for educating and training the future leaders of the U.S. Army. It is one that should not be missed by those units stationed in Germany that have the chance to study this campaign—for a very small relative cost. The professional value of such a staff ride may never be known until one of the participants becomes a key leader of our Army in the future.

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Springtime in Bavaria

Brooks E. Kleber

Dr. Brooks Kleber, now retired, formerly served as the U.S. Army Assistant Chief of Military History. Originally presented as a paper to the 1993 MACOM Historians' Council meeting at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in April 1993, this article recounts part of his experience as a prisoner of war in Germany during World War II.

Springtime in Bavaria is beautiful, even for a prisoner of war. Or, better, especially for a prisoner of war. Gone were the snow and biting winds of the previous winter when these American prisoners had trekked from their camp in Poland to a point somewhere north of Berlin. Two boxcar rides had taken them to Nuremberg. Now, in April 1945, it was time for the open road again.

Most of the marchers had mixed feelings. In a way it was good to be back on the move. The harrowing experiences at Hammelburg, the scene of George Patton's abortive raid to rescue American prisoners of war, were worth forgetting. And the attractions of the transient camp at Nuremberg had not been so great as to cause regret upon leaving. The weather meant a lot, too. It was nice having a warm sun. And everything was green, a comforting color after a winter full of cold grays.

On the other hand, the opening hour of the march was difficult. Improvised packs cut into muscles softened from inactivity and had to be adjusted. The accordion-like movements of a long column swinging into action compounded this trouble. But these matters were only physical. More important was the fact that once again great effort was about to be expended in order to reach an unknown destination, a seemingly minor inconvenience that must be experienced to be appreciated. Matters were not helped much by the nature of the most persistent rumor: Adolf Hitler planned to corral his prisoners in his mountain fastness and use them for bargaining purposes.

In midmorning, as the head of the column entered a small town, a group halfway back sighted an American fighter plane hovering high above. Even at its great altitude we could recognize it as one of ours—there was no camouflage to hide its silvery beauty. Eyes followed the darting plane as if hypnotized into an unawareness that it could bring death, even to American prisoners. The spell was broken as the fighter, sighting his target, began a swift descent. Other planes joined him.

The target was not immediately apparent to those in mid-column, but they could not risk the chance that they, themselves, would be the victims. Prisoners and guards alike broke from the road, stampeded across a narrow field, and ended their dash in the comparative safety of some neighboring woods. The bombs fell ahead. The column slowly regrouped. As the march was resumed, it was hard to determine who had suffered the most embarrassment from this panic, the American prisoners or the German guards.

The mystery of the attack soon became clear for those of us in mid-column. Several hundred yards down the road we came to the town's railway yard, which had been the target of the fighter bombers. Here the highway and tracks were parallel, and, unfortunately, some of the prisoners had been hit. Their bodies lay under blankets and greatcoats by the side of the road.

Doubtless we had erred in streaming from the road, although it was an error attributed to instinct and training, not to premeditation. In the future, admon-

ished the senior American colonel, if sighted by American aircraft, we would remain in our tracks. The Lord knew that to fast-moving planes the identity of a column of soldiers was hard enough to determine. If we took to the ditches like frightened rabbits a doubtful pilot might become convinced that this indeed was the enemy.

Several days later that part of the column that had viewed the attack from halfway back now formed the leading element. The reason for the change was simple. In any marching group, difficulties in keeping pace increase in proportion with the position. To distribute the discomforts of the march, the American colonel directed the various elements of the column to take turns in forming the van.

It was nice out in front. In addition to having easier marching conditions, there was a degree of excitement in being in the lead. You were the first to see the new village, first to know what was around the long bend in the road.

It was late in the morning when we saw something we did not want to see—more silvery objects in the clear sky. This time there was no lingering admiration, just a memory of the colonel's admonition and of the bodies by the road.

We were within earshot of the colonel now, and his word was to continue marching and to remain on the road in case we were sighted. The colonel's orders were passed back. The column silently moved on. Several more planes appeared, collecting, as if in earnest.

The business of being first in line was no longer attractive. The fighter planes by now obviously were aware of something below. And this time there was no nearby community with a tempting railroad center. The colonel crisply called for the column to halt and to stand in place. Again, his orders were quickly relayed to the rear.

There was no doubt now that our column had attracted the American fighters. They were circling off to the front at medium altitude. Without wanting to, we stood there watching—knowing that standing in the road was our best bet, yet feeling that only flight to the ditches or to the woods would really satisfy our impulses.

Suddenly, one of the planes peeled off from the group and streaked earthward. At the bottom of the dive it veered to the left and roared down the road directly toward us. It was at treetop level. The pilot, his aircraft armed with .50-caliber machine guns, was more than capable of plowing all of us under.

It is hard to recall how I felt with the plane bearing down on the column. If recollection serves me, it was a matter of having heavy feet and a light stomach. And a feeling that the speedy plane was covering the distance with an amazing slowness.

Finally, it was upon us.

It is anticlimactic to say that the pilot did not open fire; that he buzzed the entire column and gave his wings a friendly wiggle in recognition; that, to those who knew, the red markings on the plane were the signature of the all-black fighter unit stationed in Italy.

And that is the way it ended. We were recognized, and word of the column of prisoners would now get back to American authorities. In reality, this was far from an anticlimax. It meant contact with our own, no matter how fleeting, and it meant renewed hope that the whole miserable business would soon be over.

But most of all, I guess, it meant that we had not been strafed. Still standing there with our stomachs in our throats, some of us didn't even hear the American colonel give the order to resume marching.

Editor's Journal

Col. Stephen L. Bowman, director of the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, introduces this issue with his account of the U.S. Army Berlin Brigade's staff ride to the Jena/Auerstadt battlefield. Among the other features this time: the *Army History* cumulative index for 1993, and Lt. Col. Steve Dietrich's comprehensive bibliography of available DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM research materials.

With this issue, *Army History* is being printed using a new "track" setting that I hope will make our double-column format easier on our readers' eyes.

Finally, if any of our readers are interested in research topics—World War II or otherwise—in Australia, the managing editor is aware of a contract historical researcher familiar with the Australian War Memorial, its archives, and the National Library of Australia. Call or write for more information.

A. G. Fisch, Jr.

The Chief's Corner

Harold W. Nelson

Many folks here in Washington and around the Army are working hard to refine strategic concepts in a period of change. Historians are contributing to that effort in many important ways, so I am devoting this column to a few aspects of the current historian-strategist dialogue.

As we continue the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of World War II, historians can remind strategists that a nation with global commitments is always setting priorities for scarce resources. Fifty years ago, America's industries and training camps had achieved unprecedented output, but need still exceeded production. Strategists had to adjudicate demands of multiple theaters, but they also had to address other tough allocation questions associated with rearming and equipping allies, caring for refugees and liberated populations, and restoring damaged infrastructure. Such questions reflect an important dimension of our republic's approach to war. We want allies to be equals, we do not suppress humanitarian instincts until hostilities have ceased, and we rush to restore the social fabric destroyed by war. Strategic planners who ignore this dimension of American warfighting will inevitably be forced to discard their calculations of lift, throughput requirements, or reconstitution scheduling. The wisdom of the policy underlying these strategic requirements is obvious. We seek a world of flourishing democracies, each of which must be built on sound economic foundations and protected by self-sustaining defenses. When our arms are victorious, the conditions necessary for such democratic evolution must be met quickly, and thus a tension always exists between short-term operational requirements and long-range strategic goals.

In today's world, where we hear so much discussion of "two near-simultaneous MRCs (major regional contingencies)," our World War II experience also helps us see how difficult it might be to satisfy the joint operations concept of two supported commanders in chief. Perhaps we are more "global-minded" than the leaders who shaped the victories of 1945, but we should remember that the Japanese Army's aggression in China had been the major concern of American policymakers before Adolf Hitler attacked Poland and before the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor made many Americans believe that the war in the Pacific should be our primary concern. The priorities associated with the "Europe-first" strategy were not perfect in plan or execution, but they worked. Will tomorrow's strategist, faced with a regional crisis and armed with limited resources, know that his crisis is the primary strategic challenge, or will he act as if it is simply because it occurs first? Strategic decisions during the Korean War provide useful insights into this intriguing problem in global military strategy. General Douglas MacArthur saw "WAR," while strategists in Washington saw a regional challenge and devoted significant resources to reinforcing Europe.

Today's strategists are trying to help successors who might face similar tough choices by devising a strategy for preserving the capability to achieve victory throughout the period of reduced threat. Our democracy is not alone in having a history of failure in this endeavor, but most of our strategists prefer studying the experiences of America's Army as they try to "break the mold." I think historians can help by outlining the shortcomings of past strategies. The Army's focus on universal military training at the end of World War II put the institution at odds with major social forces. The Regular Army's inability to develop a team approach to its work with Reserve Components throughout most of the twentieth century weakened its political support. The armed services' inability to agree on a joint strategy for victory caused diffusion of scarce resources. Before military strategists blame their problems on external factors, our history would encourage them to overcome some of these internal tendencies that impeded their predecessors.

Our history also serves to remind us that the Army can remain heavily involved in keeping the peace for extended periods while simultaneously preparing for war. That was certainly true in the nineteenth century; it was true in China and the Philippines before World War II, and it was true in Europe and the Far East throughout the Cold War. Today's strategist must devise methods for shaping and resourcing those long-term commitments, not as distracters from an abstract future war, but as part of the ongoing struggle to broaden and strengthen democracy.

"Think globally, act locally" is a good motto for an American military strategist, but the first half of that admonition is often difficult. Our history is filled with successes and failures that can help develop such thinking.

The 1994 Conference of Army Historians

Judith Bellafaire

The 1994 Conference of Army Historians will be held 13-16 June in Washington, D.C. The conference theme will be "The U.S. Army in the War Against Japan, 1943-1945." Participants will include both military and civilian historians, with a significant number of participants from foreign nations. Veterans of the Pacific theater and former prisoners of war (POWs) will be featured speakers.

Over thirty topical sessions will focus on joint and combined operations, strategy, and leadership, as well as less traditional topics, including the experiences of women and minorities in the Pacific; the impact of the war on the U.S., Australian, and Japanese home fronts; the impact of the Pacific environment on military operations; and the study of military history through wartime art, photography, and films. There will also be an exhibit on U.S. manufacturers who produced military goods for the first time, as well as a book room for the display and sale of recent military history publications.

The study of joint operations currently is a "hot" topic among military historians, and the conference will feature three panels on joint operations in the Pacific during World War II. The panel "Joint Warfare in the Solomons" will include a presentation by Dr. Edward Marolda of the Naval Historical Center on "Joint Operations During the Solomons Campaign in Early 1944"; a paper on "Operation TOENAILS, June-October 1943," by Dr. Doug McKenna of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College; and a lecture by Tom Y'Blood of the Air Force History Office on "The Air Solomons Campaign." The second panel, "Joint Warfare in the CBI," will include presentations by Dr. H. P. Willmott, professor of military and naval strategy at the National War College, and Dr. Otha Spencer, professor emeritus at East Texas State University. The final panel focusing on joint operations will be "Joint Pacific Operations: The Army, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard," chaired by General E. H. Simmons, the director of the Marine Corps Historical Center. This session will include a discussion by Marine Corps historian Ben Frank on the H. M. Smith controversy and a paper on Army-Marine activities on the island of Kwajalein by Dr. James Walker. Coast Guard historian Dr. Robert Browning will discuss Coast Guard participation in several Pacific theater amphibious assaults.

Dr. Richard Stewart, Command Historian, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, will chair a panel on Special Operations, and present a paper on operations in the Arakan island group. Dr. Stan Sandler, Assistant Command Historian, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, will discuss "Detachment 101 OSS"; John Partin, Command Historian, U.S. Special Operations Command, will read a paper on the "Alamo Scouts"; and Dr. David Hogan of the U.S. Army Center of Military History will present a paper on "The 6th Ranger Battalion."

A panel on Intelligence, to be chaired by Dr. Bruce Saunders of the Center, will include papers by Dr. Edward Drea on "Code-breaking," Col. Roy Stanley on "Photo-interpretation by the Army Air Forces in the Pacific," and Lt. Col. Dan Kuehl on "The Development of Counter Measures to Japanese Radar."

Americans should not forget that U.S. efforts in the Pacific Theater of Operations were aided significantly by the participation of other nations. Among those international historians discussing their countries' contributions to the Allied war effort will be Dr. David M. Horner of the Strategic and Defence Studies Center, Australian National University, who will present a paper on "Combined Operations in the Southwest Pacific: The Australian Army in MacArthur's Operations." Dr. Alex Ward of Great Britain's Ministry of Defence will discuss "Preparing Britain's Army for Jungle Warfare, 1943-1945," and Dr. Petra Groen of the Royal Netherlands Army will read a paper entitled "Recovery of Dutch POWs in Asia, 1945-1946." Dr. Lars Ericson of the Swedish Military History Commission will present a paper on the observations of a Swedish military attache in Washington on the war in the Pacific. Several American scholars will also discuss various aspects of Allied cooperation in the Pacific theater. Dr. Marc Gallichio of Villanova University will describe his study of U.S. Army officers as advisers to the Chinese Army. Dr. Richard A. Russell, Naval Historical Center, will present a paper entitled "Soviet-American Cooperation in the North Pacific During World War II: Training Soviet Sailors on Lend-Lease Vessels."

Japan's perspective of the war will be presented by two visiting historians from the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies and by American historians specializing in Japanese history. Among the latter

will be Dr. Theodore Cook of William Paterson College, who will present a paper on the education and career patterns of Japanese military officers and their impact on leadership issues. Professor Haruka Koaka of the University of Maryland will offer a paper on the wartime mobilization of Japan's population.

For those who are interested in social history, panels have been planned on the Hawaiian, continental U.S., Australian, and Japanese home fronts and the experiences of women and minority soldiers in the Pacific theater. Dr. James McNaughton, Command Historian, U.S. Army Defense Language Institute, will discuss the activities of Nisei soldiers who served as interpreters. Dr. Alison Bernstein, Director of Education and Cultural Programs, Ford Foundation, will present a paper on Native Americans in the Pacific during World War II. Her 1991 book on the contributions of Native Americans during World War II was published by the University of Oklahoma Press in 1991. Mr. Robert Jefferson will present a paper on "The 93d Division," and Dr. Anthony Arthur of California State University, Northridge, and author of the highly acclaimed *Bushmasters: America's Jungle Warriors of World War II* will discuss the experiences of hispanic troops in the Pacific theater.

Historians planning to do research on the U.S. Army in the Pacific theater will be interested in attending a panel discussion on the archival materials available at the National Archives (NARA), West Point, and the Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Mr. Alan Aimone of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point will discuss General Walter Krueger's papers. Daniel Nettling, coordinator of the Military History Institute Veterans Survey, will describe the Veterans Survey Project, which presently contains over 5,000 completed surveys in its computer database, and its value to historians of World War II. An archivist from the National Archives will present an overall view of some of the records in that institution which pertain to the Pacific theater during World War II.

Several authors of recent publications will be participating in the conference. Dr. Otha Spencer, formerly of East Texas State University and author of the acclaimed *Flying The Hump: Memories of an Air War* (1992), will discuss his book, a compilation of oral history interviews and the author's own experiences in the CBI (China-Burma-India theater). Historians Judy B. Litoff and David C. Smith of Bryant College, coauthors of *We're in This War Too*, will describe the letters home from military women in the Pacific they discovered while researching their book on American women during World War II. Dr. Harry Gailey, author of *Bougainville 1943-1945: The Forgotten Campaign* and *Howlin' Mad vs. the Army: A Conflict in Command, Saipan 1944*, will speak on General Douglas MacArthur. Edward S. Miller, author of *War Plan Orange: U.S. Strategy To Defeat Japan 1897-1945*, will speak on a topic yet to be announced. Professor D. M. Goldstein of the University of Pittsburgh, author of *The Williwaw War: The Arkansas National Guard in the Aleutians in World War II*, will discuss the activities of the 7th Infantry Division in the Aleutians Campaign. Dr. Ray Skates will present a paper on "Invading Japan: Operation DOWNFALL." His book, *The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb*, will be published by the University of South Carolina Press in March.

Speakers from the ranks of veterans will include former Army nurses Prudence Burns Burrell, who served with the 268th Station Hospital in Australia, New Guinea, and Luzon, and Madeline Ullom, a POW in the Philippines throughout the war. Both women will talk informally about their wartime experiences as lieutenants. Mr. Stanley Slowinski will describe his experiences with Detachment 102 in the CBI, and Dr. Robin Higham will discuss his experiences flying for the British Army in China. Lt. Gen. Edward Flanagan, U.S. Army (Ret.), a veteran of the 503d Parachute Infantry, 11th Airborne Division, will describe his experiences in the Philippines during the war. Lt. Gen. Frederick J. Clarke, U.S. Army (Ret.), will speak about his experiences in the Pacific Theater Planning Division of Army Service Forces, Washington, D.C., between 1942 and 1945. Lt. Gen. Elmer Almquist, U.S. Army (Ret.), will discuss "Amphibious Landings and Artillery Support in a Jungle Environment and Security Measures in a Hostile Environment."

Those interested in obtaining more information about the 1994 Conference of Army Historians should contact Dr. Judith Bellafaire, Field and International Division, Room 320, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1099 14th St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20005-3402, phone number (202)-504-5368 or DSN 285-5368.

Dr. Judith Bellafaire of the Center's Field and International Division is coordinating the 1994 Conference of Army Historians.

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM: A Select Bibliography

Steve E. Dietrich

This bibliography of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was compiled by Lt. Col. Steve Dietrich, chief of the Military Studies Branch of the Center's Research and Analysis Division. Although this bibliography is in no way definitive, it lists works published and in progress by Army historians, dealing with all aspects of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM as well as works from other sources dealing with strategic mobility and global logistics during the operations. Annotations are provided in brackets when needed to clarify the subject of the work.

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INTERVIEWS

Numerous interviews have been conducted with participants at all levels and in all facets of involvement with Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The oral history collections at the U.S. Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pa., and at the Oral History Branch in the U.S. Army Center of Military History are noteworthy and continue to grow.

Other interviews have been published such as the following:

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Announcement of the 1994 Society for Military History Meeting

The 1994 annual meeting of the Society for Military History (formerly the American Military Institute) will be held 8-10 April 1994 in Bethesda, Maryland. The theme of the meeting will be "Civil-Military Relations." Nonmembers can obtain information about meeting registration, accommodations, and the program from: The Program Chairman, Society for Military History 1994 Meeting, PO Box 4762, McLean, Virginia 22103.

1944
April - June

22 Apr - The 24th and 41st Infantry Divisions make amphibious landings near Hollandia, New Guinea. The 24th lands at Tanahmerah Bay, and the 41st, less the 163d Regimental Combat Team (RCT), lands at Humboldt Bay, opening a pincers operation designed to capture three Japanese air bases on the Lake Sentani Plain. The Hollandia area is to be developed as an Allied air, naval, and logistical center from which future operations can be mounted against the Japanese in western New Guinea and, ultimately, the Philippines.

- The 163d RCT, 41st Division, lands at Aitape, New Guinea, 125 miles southeast of Hollandia. The objectives are several Japanese airstrips that will be used to support operations at Hollandia.

- The Allied occupation of the Marshall Islands is completed as Company I, 111th Infantry, makes an unopposed landing on Ujelang Atoll.

23 Apr - Elements of the 162d Infantry, 41st Infantry Division, occupy the town of Hollandia without opposition.

26 Apr - The 21st Infantry, 24th Division, captures Hollandia Drome, first of the three airfields in the Hollandia area. The 186th Infantry, 41st Division, captures the other two, Cyclops Drome and Sentani Drome, on the same day. Elements of the two divisions link up near the Hollandia Drome, completing the pincers movement. Throughout the operation Japanese opposition has been remarkably light.

- U.S. Army troops seize control of the Montgomery Ward & Co. plant in Chicago following the company's refusal to comply with a presidential order to recognize an employee-approved labor union. Company management claims that the union does not represent a majority of its employees at the plant.

28 Apr - More than 700 U.S. soldiers are killed when German E-boats attack a group of LSTs (landing ship, tank) engaged in an amphibious landing training exercise near Slapton Sands, England. Two LSTs are sunk and a third is severely damaged.

29 Apr - U.S. troops are withdrawn from the Montgomery Ward & Co. plant in Chicago. Federally appointed managers continue to operate the plant until 9 May, when plant employees vote to join the union.

7 May - The War Department announces that there are 183,618 Axis prisoners of war in the United States.

8 May - General Dwight D. Eisenhower schedules 5 June as D-day for the invasion of northern France.

11 May - The U.S. Fifth and British Eighth Armies launch Operation DIADEM, the Allies' spring offensive in southern Italy. Intent on breaking through the Gustav Line and driving up the Liri valley to Rome and beyond, the Allies hope to keep as many German divisions as possible busy in Italy, making them unavailable to assist in defending against the upcoming invasion of Normandy.

16 May - The Allied advance overwhelms the last of the Gustav Line defenses. The Germans begin pulling back to their series of defensive positions in the Hitler Line.

17 May - The 1st Battalion, 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), better known as Merrill's Marauders, leads the Chinese 150th Regiment in the capture of the airstrip at Myitkyina, Burma. The Japanese have been using this airstrip to fly missions against U.S. transport aircraft delivering supplies to China.

18 May - Polish troops of the British Eighth Army capture Monte Cassino. Since 17 January 1944, three unsuccessful attempts have been made at taking the height.

- Elements of the 163d Infantry make an amphibious landing on Wakde Island, about 2 miles off the coast of New Guinea and 135 miles northwest of Hollandia.

- Operations to seize the Admiralty Islands are concluded.

21 May - Allied planes begin landing on the captured airstrip on Wakde Island. By 26 May all Japanese opposition on the island is suppressed.

23 May - A major Allied offensive is launched by the VI Corps to break out of the Anzio beachhead.

- The French Expeditionary Corps captures Pico, an important road junction and strongpoint in the Hitler

Line.
The fall of Pico seriously threatens the stability of the sector of the Hitler Line blocking the II Corps' advance toward a link with the forces at Anzio.

24 May - Terracina falls to the 85th Division of the II Corps, providing access to the coastal highway that runs to the Anzio beachhead.

25 May - Elements of the II Corps and VI Corps link up at Borgo Grappo on the Tyrrhenian coast. As the link solidifies over the next few days, the Allies continue the push toward Rome on a united front.

- Elements of the 3d Infantry Division capture Cisterna.

27 May - Elements of the 186th and 162d Infantry regiments make an assault landing on Biak Island.

30 May - Invasion troops begin loading into transports for the trip across the English Channel.

4 Jun - Elements of the Fifth Army enter Rome. The Germans, who had begun a withdrawal from the city the day before, fight only delaying actions. By dusk on 5 June Rome is entirely in Allied hands.

- Unfavorable weather conditions force a one-day postponement of the invasion of France.

5 Jun - At 2215 planes carrying troops of the 101st Airborne Division begin taking off from airfields in England. Both the 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions are to make assault jumps in Normandy in preparation for the amphibious landing.

6 Jun - The most powerful invasion force ever assembled storms ashore on the Normandy coast of France, supported by massive aerial and naval bombardment. The German defenders are caught by surprise, allowing the British and Canadians on the Allied left and the American VII Corps on the right to secure beachheads. On OMAHA Beach in the Allied center, the V Corps landing is strongly opposed. By the end of the day, despite heavy losses in men and materiel, the V Corps has established its beachhead.

7 Jun - Elements of the 168th Infantry capture the Italian port of Civitavecchia.

8 Jun - On Biak Island, Mokmer Drome is captured.

9 Jun - Elements of the 1st Armored Division occupy Viterbo, Italy.

12 Jun - The 101st Airborne Division captures Carentan, France.

15 Jun - U.S. Marine Corps troops make an assault landing on the Marianas island of Saipan.

17 Jun - The 165th and 105th Infantry of the 27th Infantry Division reinforce the marines on Saipan.

- The VII Corps completes a drive across the Cotentin peninsula, cutting off the defenders of Cherbourg from any hope of reinforcement.

19-20 Jun - The U.S. Fifth Fleet scores a decisive victory in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, sinking three Japanese aircraft carriers and two fleet tankers. Two more carriers, a battleship, three cruisers, and another tanker are damaged. 476 Japanese planes are destroyed and, more important, 445 seasoned Japanese pilots are killed. In a single battle Japanese naval aviation is virtually eliminated as a factor in the outcome of the war.

19-21 Jun - A strong storm strikes the Normandy coast, destroying two artificial ports and causing extensive damage to craft attempting to unload supplies in the beachhead.

22 Jun - President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs into law the "G.I. Bill of Rights," providing educational and other benefits to U.S. veterans.

26 Jun - Cherbourg falls to the VII Corps. Considered one of the most important objectives of the early stage of the invasion, Cherbourg is one of the primary reasons the invasion takes place in Normandy. The Allies need a major port through which to unload the vast quantities of supplies necessary to keep the offensive moving. Unfortunately, German demolition of Cherbourg's port facilities is so complete that it will take months before any appreciable quantity of materiel can be brought ashore there.

This chronology was prepared by Mr. Edward N. Bedessem of the Center's Historical Services Division.

Historical Work During World War II

Stetson Conn

(Part two of three parts)

The following excerpt from Doctor Conn's book, Historical Work in the United States Army, 1862-1954, *is the second of three installments in* Army History. *The first portion of chapter 4, Historical Work During World War II, appeared in issue no. 28.*

...As in World War I, Army historical work had made a belated start and had a long way to go before an effective coverage of the Army's experiences in World War II could be achieved. Furthermore, Army officers generally had only a dim appreciation of the function and value of historical work in their organizations. The task of persuading them of its utility had fallen on the shoulders of a young and comparatively junior lieutenant colonel who, however able and affable he was, had to feel his way most carefully in asserting the responsibilities given to the new historical office.

One of Colonel [John M.] Kemper's first actions as Chief of the Historical Branch was to recommend that the choice of Henry Pringle as Chief Historian be disapproved. Pringle had expressed discontent over the subordination of this position to the military chief, and there were reports that he was something of a prima donna who might not become an effective member of a team. After Pringle dropped from the picture sometime in August [1943], Professor [Henry Steele] Commager was approached, but he like Pringle was principally interested in writing and not in exercising the supervisory and editorial responsibilities prescribed for the Chief Historian. In mid-September Dr. William L. Langer of the Office of Strategic Services suggested Dr. Walter Livingston Wright. Following service as President of Roberts College and the American College for Women in Istanbul, Turkey, "Livy" Wright had recently joined the Library of Congress as a consultant. Wright quickly won the enthusiastic endorsement of all who knew him. He was strongly recommended on behalf of the Advisory Committee by President [James Phinney] Baxter, and was approved by [Assistant Secretary of War John J.] McCloy on 22 September. It took another two months to get a formal release from the Library of Congress so that he could join the Historical Branch and become the Army's first Chief Historian. In Colonel Kemper's judgment he proved to be an ideal man for the post.

The Historical Branch began its work with almost no staff, no planned internal organization, and no articulated plan for action. Although authorized thirteen military and twenty-two civilian employees at the end of 1943, the actual number working in Washington in early March 1944 was seven officers and sixteen civilians. The first man to join Kemper in the new office was Maj. Charles H. Taylor, a tower of strength in Army history work until he returned to his professorship in medieval history at Harvard three years later. Other recruits during August included Lt. Col. S. L. A. Marshall, in civilian life a military analyst for the Detroit *News*; Maj. Jesse S. Douglas, previously of the National Archives staff; Capt. Roy Lamson, a teacher of English at Williams College; and Dr. George S. Auxier, previously head of the Engineers' historical office and the ranking civilian professional until Dr. Wright joined the staff.

On 30 August 1943, the chief of G-2 put the branch under his Deputy for Administration, although the deputy apparently did little to affect its development. Also the branch's location on the top floor of the Pentagon isolated it from the rest of G-2. In March 1944, in order to make it easier for historians to get at records coming in from overseas, a transfer of the Historical Branch to the Operations Division almost came about. But a new chief of G-2, Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, helped persuade the branch to stay by placing it under his direct supervision and promising his effective support. Shortly thereafter Kemper characterized Bissell as "the stoutest champion we could have on our team." Coincidentally the branch announced a firm plan for its internal organization, and by the time it did so, 15 May 1944, it had nine officers and twenty-two civilians aboard.

Although the Historical Branch started without clearly defined objectives to govern the immediate thrust and scope of its activities, a number emerged in practice in 1943 and early 1944. The branch aimed to make itself primarily a supervisory and editorial office by encouraging a maximum decentralization of re-

search and writing; it was, as Colonel Kemper put it in early 1944, "less concerned with writing history itself than with assuring that such history as is written is of high quality." For many months the office concentrated on promoting work in operational history, the area previously neglected. Rather than issuing formal directives, it depended on helpful assistance and informal liaison visits to guide the development of theater historical programs. It tried to limit research and writing within the branch to those subjects and areas that it was not practicable for any other Army historical office to cover. Both in and outside the branch it urged the importance of writing preliminary narratives as soon as possible both for current use and as groundwork for the official history to come. Finally, as the Chief Historian pointed out in March 1944, while "the Historical Branch was created in order to insure the writing of a definitive history of the Army in World War II," that history could not be written or even planned in detail until the fighting was over. In the meantime the branch's principal objective was to facilitate production by other Army historical offices of the maximum amount of sound historical work, to encourage and increase rather than to limit their work, and to disturb as little as possible writing and publication programs already in existence.

The Historical Branch received its first specific assignment on 1 August 1943. It was to prepare relatively brief studies of particular military operations to be written and published as quickly as possible. Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall had asked for such studies the preceding April. He wanted them published for internal Army circulation only, and particularly for distribution to hospitalized soldiers who had been wounded in the actions described. The Special Services Division, given the task first, persuaded the Chief of Staff's office that the Historical Branch was a more appropriate agency to handle it. Lt. Col. S. L. A. Marshall and others were made available to work on the studies, and Colonel Kemper was delighted to get the assignment. After six weeks or so of work in collaboration with Air Forces and Navy historians, in October 1943 Colonel Marshall completed a draft manuscript on "The Tokyo Raid" of April 1942, the first historical narrative produced by the branch. That work never saw the light of day, but a less worthy item, *To Bizerte with the II Corps*, written principally by Lt. Harris Warren, was approved for publication on 4 November 1943. With mapping assistance from the Historical Section, Army War College, the following February it became the first publication of the World War II historical office, and the first of fourteen paper-back volumes to appear in The American Forces in Action (AFA) series. The second title in this series, on the Buna-Gona action in the far Pacific, was published in July 1944 as *The Papuan Campaign*.

Colonel Kemper doubted that units in combat operations were keeping useful and accurate records. To check on the matter, he left his new office on 6 August 1943 for the Aleutians, where on and after 15 August he participated in the operations against Kiska. His experiences there, coupled with the evident inadequacy of the records available in Washington for preparing a study on the campaign in North Africa, convinced him that if good combat history was to be written trained men must be sent from Washington to the active theaters to help correct defects in record keeping and to obtain additional information through interviews with participants. Information from interviews would fill in gaps and correct inaccuracies in such records as had been and were being compiled. Since the theaters were retaining their most important records, it also seemed necessary to do most of the preliminary research and writing overseas, with drafts returned to Washington for editing and publication. With high-level backing, Kemper obtained permission to send nine three-man teams overseas to work on combat studies, hoping at the time to keep the work of these teams under the control of his branch. In late October, even before approval of the plan for teams, Colonel Marshall left for the Pacific. And early in December Kemper himself accompanied the first two teams to the Mediterranean, spending two months visiting there and in England. In the Mediterranean he helped establish a separate Army historical office in what was about to become a theater under overall British command, and he drafted a directive to guide its work. The directive was issued internally rather than as orders from across the Atlantic that might have been resented or ignored. In the Pacific, where he stayed until April 1944, Marshall was a participant in the Makin and Kwajalein operations and developed a new technique for group combat interviews that became a model for historical work dealing with restricted or smaller unit actions.

Meanwhile, some further joint ventures with the Navy in operational history were brewing. One began with a proposal in October 1943 for Mr. Bernard De Voto, well-known author and Pulitzer Prize winner, to undertake a combat history of the North African campaign for the Army. About the same time the Navy was

beginning a work on Guadalcanal. After a conversation with Colonel Kemper, and with McCloy's enthusiastic backing, the Army proposed that De Voto, instead of working on North Africa, undertake the Guadalcanal study as a joint Army, Navy, and Marine Corps project. It had to give up that idea after the Office of Naval Intelligence refused to go along, and other commitments prevented De Voto from returning to the North Africa project. While the Guadalcanal proposal was under consideration, the War and Navy secretaries discussed the possibility of working on an overall joint popular history of military operations. The Historical Branch discouraged this proposal. Although it favored collaboration on monographs covering particular joint operations such as the Tokyo raid, the branch thought it preferable for each service to prepare its own popular history, as the Army was then planning to do in one or two volumes. After the services had completed their individual popular histories, a joint work based upon them might be undertaken. A third prod in the direction of joint historical work came when Dr. [E. Pendleton] Herring's Bureau of the Budget organization sponsored a new Advisory Council on War History with the Executive Secretary of the American Historical Association as its chairman. Despite presidential backing, this council had no success in persuading the services to undertake a joint history. Indeed, in Dr. Wright's opinion, the job could be done only by an outside civilian historian of the highest academic respectability as well as outstanding writing ability, one who was armed with an authoritative presidential mandate to the services to open up their records. In practice the Army and Navy were content from 1944 onward to follow their own separate paths in recording the history of World War II.

In the spring of 1944 the fruits of overseas historical work began pouring into the Historical Branch. The number of historical teams was substantially increased, and the practice of sending or stationing branch representatives overseas for extended periods was expanded. At the beginning of June the historical office was working on six studies that its chief hoped to see ready for the printer during the month. By special arrangement, two were being readied for publication by the *Infantry Journal*'s press as small books: *The Capture of Attu*, on which the branch then had Mr. Sewell T. Tyng working as an expert consultant; and *Island Victory*, the principal literary fruit of Colonel Marshall's visit to the Pacific. Both went to press in June and were published in October. Marshall had also written a half dozen other pieces for the *Infantry Journal*, and the branch hoped in due course to reprint all of Marshall's Pacific writings in a single larger volume that it believed could have great value as a training vehicle. As for the historical teams, while the members henceforth would clearly come under the jurisdiction of overseas commanders after they arrived in the theaters, their preliminary indoctrination in the branch, the almost continuous presence (at least in the European area) of branch representatives, and voluminous unofficial correspondence with them and with theater historians everywhere, tended to give the program a good deal of unity. Following Colonel Kemper's tour the principal overseas tours of branch representatives in 1944 in the Atlantic area were those of Major Lamson in the Mediterranean from January to June, of Colonel Taylor in the European Theater from April 1944 to January 1945, of Colonel Stamps (under branch auspices) and Colonel Marshall to the European Theater shortly after D-day, and of Colonel Kemper to that theater again in November. Before departing Marshall was formally designated "Popular Historian," and his trip was designed primarily to complete his orientation for the task of writing the Army's popular history of its military operations. Actually he remained in Europe to become deputy to the Army's theater historian, Col. William A. Ganoe, and to succeed Ganoe when the latter returned to the United States.

The Historical Branch had hoped to send four more combat studies to the printer in June 1944, but these hopes were shattered by personnel changes, by underestimation of the time required for editing and mapping, and by the discovery that at least two of the studies needed basic rewriting. In analyzing the problem, Dr. Wright pointed out that the academic professionals (in and out of uniform) in Army combat history work, both in Washington and overseas, were not the types to produce the sort of short, journalistic narratives, quickly written and printed, that General Marshall had had in mind for hospitalized soldiers. If that were still the goal, he thought the task ought to be turned over to journalists. The branch opted instead for improving the historical and literary quality of its combat histories, and rewriting or discarding those that did not measure up to acceptable historical standards. The basic manuscripts of the accepted histories were fully documented, although they were printed without footnotes. Fortunately, three manuscripts on late 1943 operations in southern Italy, written by members of the first historical teams sent overseas, showed marked improvement over the first two AFA pamphlets and could be published in the series in late 1944 and early

1945.

Colonel Taylor returned from Europe in early 1945 to take charge of the branch's editorial section and complete his own study on the invasion of Normandy. At the time he surmised that two to three dozen more studies for the AFA series might be forthcoming in the following two years, but far fewer were actually to appear in print as official histories. Colonel Marshall's work on Bastogne was diverted to the *Infantry Journal*'s press in order to get a quicker printing and broader circulation. Several other works (as one on Sicily) were discontinued, judged not redeemable after being worked on extensively in the branch. Planning was beginning on a definitive official history to include combat operations, a project that would eclipse the AFA series in 1946. And Taylor himself chartered a new course for the series and for all Army combat history productions with his work on *Omaha Beachhead*. Much longer than the preceding combat histories, it required a larger format which in turn allowed better and more elaborate mapping. Taylor's access to German records captured in France made *Omaha* a pioneer work in covering the enemy's side of the story authoritatively. And it was the first volume in the AFA series to be openly published, as all the others would be presently. Aside from their intrinsic merit, *Omaha* and the other AFA volumes published during and immediately after the war went a long way toward arousing both Army and public interest in further Army historical work on World War II and in establishing standards for the Army's official history series launched in 1946.

In May 1944 the Branch undertook a different sort of theater history, when Dr. T. H. Vail Motter began work on recording the story of the United States Army Forces in the Middle East. Enough of the records of this noncombat theater had been returned to the United States to permit Dr. Motter to do his first year's work in Washington and New York. Then the branch sent him as a civilian historian to the theater's headquarters in Cairo, and beyond, "to function there with authority" in getting at the records necessary for his work. A somewhat thorny character, Motter asserted his rights to the records so assiduously that he almost landed in jail. In due course strong messages from Washington clarified his status and secured for him the access to classified material that he needed. This project was another step in the transition from wartime monographs to the official history. After the theater's responsibility broadened to include the Persian Gulf Command Motter turned his interest in that direction, and his volume on *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia* became one of the earlier titles in the postwar series.

A request from a G-2 committee of which Colonel Kemper was a member led to one of the first monographs produced by the Historical Branch, "Materials on the History of Military Intelligence in the United States, 1885-1944," a short narrative with voluminous appendices completed by Dr. George Auxier in January 1944. But later in that year, when G-2 tried to get the branch to prepare a detailed history of its operating organization, the Military Intelligence Service, higher authority backed the branch's resistance to embarking on such an undertaking. It thereby established an important principle: even though administratively under G-2, the branch "should not undertake a specific study of any one division of the General Staff, but should keep its perspective, viewing the whole of the General Staff as a unit."

At the time the Historical Branch was established, at least three Army offices were compiling chronologies of World War II, General Spaulding's Historical Section, the Special Services Division, and G-2's Dissemination Unit. G-2 directed the transfer of its unit's chronology effort to the Historical Branch in December 1943. Based on all accessible operational records as well as more readily available published material, the task became increasingly complex for the branch as the fighting spread and grew in intensity. Within a year the staff working on the chronology grew from two to five people; nevertheless it fell progressively behind in its production schedule. Continued after the war, the project provided the basis for the *Chronology* volume of the official series published in 1960.

During the war, a principal use of the chronology was in providing information to the writers of a concise history of the war's combat operations published by the *Infantry Journal*'s press in 1945 and 1946. In 1943 Special Services had elaborated its chronology into a periodically produced outline of the war's developments. The whole was compiled by Maj. Harvey A. DeWeerd and published as *The War in Outline, 1939-1944*, by the *Infantry Journal*'s press. Both this press and Special Services wanted a more sophisticated narrative version, and the Historical Branch reluctantly agreed to assume responsibility for its preparation, though not for its publication. As author, it employed Dr. Roger Shugg, who had entered government service from teaching at Indiana University. Working rapidly in 1944, using information supplied by the branch's Chronology Section to the extent possible, and getting

a good deal of assistance from other branch members, Dr. Shugg turned out a book-length narrative published as *The World at War, 1939-1944*, covering operations through October 1944. When the manuscript was ready for printing at the end of that year, the branch sent it to the Information and Educational Division, which had inherited Special Services' responsibility for using this material. In turn, that division sent the manuscript to the *Infantry Journal*. The *Journal* copyrighted it and printed 100,000 copies before the end of April 1945, the largest circulation of any Army-produced historical work for many years to come. After Dr. Shugg left the Historical Branch in the spring of 1945, Major DeWeerd, who was by then with the *Infantry Journal*, produced a new edition of the volume that covered the fighting to the end of the war in 1945. This version became *World War II: A Concise History*, published by the *Infantry Journal* in 1946.

Another task undertaken reluctantly by the branch at the direction of "higher authority" was preparation of a guide to the Pentagon. The draft was completed in mid-October 1944. Dr. Wright found it in some ways very good, but too flippant in its approach, particularly in its early pages. The Pentagon had already become the butt of jokes, and the Chief Historian felt there was a very real chance of attracting unfavorable attention to the Historical Branch and its other work unless the draft as submitted was considerably modified. So did Otto Nelson, now a general. After discussing the matter with Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, Nelson directed a complete revision of the draft, to include reducing the narrative to allow more room for pictures, eliminating all touches of humorous treatment, and adopting all corrections, deletions, and suggestions made by the Under Secretary's office unless there were very good reasons not to do so. The Historical Branch was made responsible for publishing the guide. As a consequence Dr. Wright himself had to spend about three weeks in rewriting the Pentagon narrative; and after General Nelson approved the revised product, Major Lamson had to go to New York for a fortnight to expedite its publication. He brought back the first printed copies on 9 December 1944. This was one product the branch was happy to have published without credits or any indication that it had originated in an Army historical office.

On a considerably more exalted plane, Colonel Kemper and Dr. Wright had worked informally from late 1943 onward to initiate historical work in the offices of the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. In the latter office, both in the fall of 1943 and about a year later, General Nelson rebuffed Kemper's approaches, principally because he felt the Historical Branch should stick to what he considered to be its basic mission, producing combat studies. In the meantime the Chief Historian had more success with the War Department's civilian leadership. In February 1944 representatives of Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson told Dr. Wright that they would like to have an historian. A month later Wright found one in the person of Dr. Troyer S. Anderson, who had been teaching at the University of Iowa. Although employed by the Historical Branch, Anderson was assigned by it to work in the Under Secretary's office. A similar approach through a senior advisor of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson secured his agreement to accept an historian. Dr. Rudolph A. Winnacker, who had been with the Office of Strategic Services and its predecessor for three years, began work in Stimson's office in October 1944 under an employment arrangement similar to Dr. Anderson's. Placing an historian in the Chief of Staff's area would have to await the end of the fighting.

Both Dr. Anderson and Dr. Winnacker made substantial progress on their projects during the succeeding two years although both became engaged in various tasks only indirectly related to their assignments. In 1944 and 1945, Anderson had to prepare annual and "five-year" reports as well as shorter periodic reports and drafts of speeches for the Under Secretary. Nevertheless, by the summer of 1946 he had completed the bulk of the research required for the story of the Under Secretary's office during World War II—basically, the high-level story of Army supply during the war—and also the draft of a 500-page manuscript covering the period to the spring of 1942. Dr. Winnacker had even more of his history in preliminary draft form by the early spring of 1946, but thereafter other assignments prevented him from doing much more. Together these projects helped materially to improve the interest and support of the Army's civilian leaders in historical work. Rather curiously, considering McCloy's active interest in that work, no evidence has been found of any proposal during the war for historical coverage of the Assistant Secretary of War's activities.

For some time, Major DeWeerd had wanted to become the Chief of Staff's historian. In August 1945, soon after the Japanese offer to surrender, he asked General Marshall for access to his papers in order to prepare a definitive history of his activities since 1939. This led General Marshall to assign DeWeerd the task of preparing a "classified fully documented account of the strategic direction of the war" in coordination with

the Historical Branch and with a view toward publication of an abridged version. DeWeerd was placed in the Current Group of the Operations Division instead of the Chief of Staff's office, so that he could simultaneously fulfill a separately levied requirement to produce an administrative history of OPD during the war. At the end of October DeWeerd proposed a professional staff of five to complete work on these projects within a year and a half. Although DeWeerd himself left a few months later, the work he launched developed into one of the more fruitful of the Army's World War II historical efforts, producing three major volumes for the official history. —*To be continued.*

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Ms. Denise Tomasello is a program analyst with DTIC.

World War II Fiftieth Anniversary Ceremony and Symposium Announced

Old Dominion University, the General Douglas MacArthur Foundation, and the Douglas MacArthur Memorial are cosponsoring a special symposium on the fiftieth anniversary of General Douglas MacArthur's return to the Philippines in 1944. This symposium on World War II is scheduled to be held at the MacArthur Memorial Museum in Norfolk, Virginia, 20-22 October 1994.

The papers to be presented will focus on such topics as strategic decisions; President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Admiral Ernest J. King, and MacArthur; MacArthur's Australian allies; the Japanese occupation of the Philippines; Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) intelligence activities; guerrilla operations in the Philippines; operations (the general military campaign); and the effects of MacArthur's return.

A reception and dinner with a guest speaker will be held the evening of the first day.

For further information, contact Dr. W. Preston Burton, MacArthur Memorial, MacArthur Square, Norfolk, VA 23510. Phone: (804) 441-2965, or FAX: (804) 441-5389.

The Coming of Age: The Role of the Helicopter in the Vietnam War

Herbert P. Lepore

Setting the Stage

For many Americans, the Vietnam War was the most divisive war ever fought in our nation's history. Most Americans old enough to remember it—or even to have fought in it—can reflect on how it tore at the very core of the nation's political, sociological, educational, and moral fiber. Through the medium of television, Americans had a front-row seat to the suffering, death, and destruction emanating from that war.

During their almost ceaseless television exposure to the Vietnam War, Americans had etched in their memory the image of a military machine not heretofore seen very often on the evening news in America's homes. That machine was the military helicopter.

True, American troops had used the helicopter earlier in the Korean War, but its use was limited primarily to medical evacuations, transportation, and logistical support. Television coverage of the Korean conflict was miniscule compared to that given the Vietnam War, so popular awareness of the helicopter was limited. All of the American service arms had helicopters during the Korean War, but probably it was the Army that made the most significant use of the relatively new helicopter. In early 1951 the Army dispatched three medical detachments to Korea, each with four H-13 medical evacuation helicopters, which were used to evacuate over 221,000 American wounded to mobile Army surgical hospitals, otherwise known as MASH units. The Korean War was unique in that the extensive use of the helicopter for aerial medical evacuation of seriously wounded fighting men added a new dimension to the art of war—ironically, one of saving lives.

The Marine Corps used the helicopter in the Korean War with the establishment of helicopter transport squadrons, which provided tactical transportation, reconnaissance, and logistical and medical support. The Marine Corps had been the only armed service to begin experimenting with the tactical use of helicopters after World War II. In fact, the concept of "vertical envelopment" dated back to 1947, but was more extensively developed only after the Korean War.

As the conflict in Korea slowly wound down in 1953, the U.S. Army sent to Korea the first two of what would become known as helicopter transportation companies, the 6th and the 13th Helicopter Companies, which had H-19 helicopters. These were used to carry United Nations negotiators to Panmunjom, Korea, to negotiate an armistice with the North Koreans and the Communist Chinese forces on 27 July 1953. The same two companies were also used in the repatriation of United Nations prisoners of war.

Of course, the Korean conflict was not the first war in which the helicopter was used in a combat environment. During World War II, in April 1944, the Army Air Forces had used a Sikorsky R-6 helicopter to evacuate wounded personnel in Burma. (1)

After the end of the Korean War in 1953, adaptability of the helicopter to military doctrine underwent serious discussion and evaluation. The Army and the marines tested and used helicopters as troop transports during the 1950s and early 1960s. Korea had provided a suitable paradigm about the efficiency of the helicopter for transporting troops and supplies over difficult, insurmountable terrain. Tactical doctrine, therefore, was irrevocably changed, because soldiers and equipment now could be moved with celerity to an objective, no matter what the terrain. During the Korean War a number of U.S. Army combat officers envisioned the possibility of using armed helicopters. If these machines could move men and materiel regardless of terrain, they reasoned, could they not also provide close air support to ground troops—an innovation that would change military doctrine in future wars. However, it was not until several years after Korea that the Army at Fort Rucker, Alabama, surreptitiously placed guns and rockets on helicopters and test-fired them to assess the helicopter as an aerial weapons platform. The reason for the secrecy lay in the fact that other Army combat arms, such as the Infantry, Artillery, and Armor, believed that the use of ordnance and armaments doctrinally was restricted to them and, therefore, should not be given to an interloper such as an organic Army aviation element. The Army was also involved with the Air Force in an ongoing dispute about close air support to ground units. That function ostensibly was delegated to the Air Force as a result of the Key West Agreement of 1947. By the late 1950s, however, the Army was allowed to field the pentomic division's Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Platoon, which uti-

lized armed helicopters. Yet by the end of the 1950s, acceptance of the armed helicopter was still limited in most military circles, and it would not be until the 1960s that the existence and use of armed helicopters were finally accepted within the Department of Defense. Compared to those of the Korean War period, the helicopters of the late 1950s and early 1960s were larger, more powerful, and, of course, armed. (2)

Changes in the Wind: Preparation of the Helicopter for War

The inauguration of John F. Kennedy to the presidency in 1961 brought about profound changes that affected Army aviation—particularly regarding the use of the helicopter. The political and military doctrine of "massive retaliation" promulgated during the 1950s no longer was an acceptable option. One reason for the diminishing influence of the massive retaliation strategy was the onset of "brush-fire wars." These were small wars fought with conventional weapons in the so-called Third World or nonaligned regions and involved the use of guerrilla or paramilitary forces. At the time of John F. Kennedy's inauguration such a war already was taking place in Southeast Asia involving North Vietnam (aligned with the Soviet Union) and South Vietnam (an ally of the United States). (3)

In the late 1950s and into the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union became caught up in a mutual frenzy of supplying arms, advisers, and equipment to buttress their respective allies in Asia. In 1961 the U.S. Army sent its first armed helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to support South Vietnamese troops. By 1963 the United States had 21,000 military advisers (the equivalent of a reinforced division) in South Vietnam. They were being supported by one of the most significant fixed-wing aircraft in the Army's inventory in South Vietnam, the twin-engine CV-2 Caribou transport. It served the Army well, with a short-field landing and takeoff capability that made it highly suitable for Vietnam. In April 1966, however, the Army relinquished it to the U.S. Air Force as part of a memorandum of agreement by which the Air Force, in turn, no longer claimed any suzerainty over tactical helicopters in South Vietnam. (4)

The military and political activity taking place in South Vietnam during 1960-62 evinced the need for the Army to examine its helicopter requirements and tactics—particularly in regard to South Vietnam. Lt. Gen. Gordon B. Rogers chaired a board in 1960 which had as its primary mission the upgrading of Army aviation elements, such as tactical, surveillance, and observation aircraft, particularly helicopters. The concept behind the upgrading was the need to meet tactical contingencies such as conventional wars, brush-fire wars, or what would later be referred to as low- or mid-intensity conflicts. Akin to the upgrading was the board's recommendation that the soon-to-be-ubiquitous UH-1 (Huey) helicopter become the primary helicopter in the Army's active aircraft inventory. The Rogers Board also recommended the procurement of the CH-47 (Chinook) twin-engine cargo helicopter. Both of these aircraft were to acquit themselves well in the ensuing Vietnam War. (5)

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in 1962 ordered a study on the tactical mobility of the Army ground forces, particularly in regard to airmobility, i.e., the use of helicopters to transport troops to a given area and to provide close air support. Ironically, the Army for all intents and purposes already was utilizing airmobile operations at the time. In 1962 Mr. McNamara ordered Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, the Army's first director of aviation, to establish and chair a board to implement this study. The Howze Board, as it came to be known, convened at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1962. It performed numerous tests and studies and posited the thesis that Army aircraft, particularly helicopters, could provide airmobile assets necessary to enhance ground forces' combat efffectiveness. The concept of airmobility entailed the use of helicopter-borne troops to be inserted anywhere on a battlefield to engage the enemy quickly and effectively. Airmobility was tailored for the subsequent Vietnam War and used with effect. The Howze Board also recommended the fielding of a cavalry combat brigade to fight brush-fire wars. The Department of Defense, however, deferred action on this full recommendation, although it did create and test an air assault division, which included an organic helicopter battalion.

The 11th Air Assault Division was established at Fort Benning, Georgia, to test all facets of airmobility. The division passed its airmobility tests by the end of 1964 and on 1 July 1965 assumed operational status as a tactical division, renamed the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The "1st Air Cav," as it became known, had its own organic aircraft and could provide its own tactical and logistical support.

The division's activation came none too soon. Because of political and military perturbations in South Vietnam in the spring of 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson decided to deploy tactical units. The 3d Marine Division was the first such unit, deploying in April. In July 1965 the 1st Cavalry Division received

its orders. It deployed in August 1965 and arrived in South Vietnam in September. It became the Army's first division-size unit to engage the enemy and to spend over 2,000 days in South Vietnam, thus making the 1st Air Cav the longest-serving Army unit "in country" during the war. It received numerous citations and awards for combat. (6)

The Call to Combat: Army Aviation at War in Vietnam

South Vietnam was a milieu conducive to the use of the helicopter in both tactical and nontactical situations. The country lacked an extended road and highway system, and the roads that did exist often came under attack by the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army (NVA), thus precluding or restricting their use. In addition, the varied topography of South Vietnam, which included an extensive canopy of jungle, mountainous terrain, swamps, and an expansive delta, was ideally suited to the use of helicopters for lift and support purposes. Throughout the period of active American participation in the Vietnam War (1961-73), the Army and Marine Corps divisions in country had organic helicopter units, as did a number of Army brigades that served in South Vietnam. American combat units normally were not in country very long before they were in the field engaging the enemy. Three things favored American ground forces: tactical mobility, firepower, and logistical support. All three were achieved with the helicopter. (7)

The use of helicopters in the Vietnam conflict was to change forever the American doctrine of tactical warfare. Helicopters proved to be multidimensional. They performed tactical airmobile missions, including the insertion and extraction of ground forces; rescued downed aviators (along with Air Force fixed-wing aircraft); provided close air support with the UH-1 and AH-1 (Cobra) helicopter gunships; performed aerial reconnaissance; and undertook medical evacuation missions, known as "dust off" missions. Approximately 390,000 wounded American fighting men's lives were saved by medical evacuation helicopter crews during the Vietnam War. This was more than ten times the number of American lives saved by helicopters in Korea. There are at least three reasons for this seemingly disparate statistic: helicopters in the Vietnam War were able to carry more litter cases than the small H-13 helicopters used during the Korean War; there were more field hospitals; and the Vietnam War simply was a longer war. On the other hand, medical evacuation was more difficult during the Vietnam War because medevac helicopters often had to land in or near hotly contested landing zones. In Korea, most medical evacuations took place in terrain that was more accessible, out of range of enemy fire, or to the rear of a fixed defensive position such as a bunker or foxhole.

Helicopters provided the majority of the logistical support missions in the field and to fire bases and isolated outposts throughout the length and breadth of South Vietnam. Unique to this war was the fact that light and medium artillery could be lifted and moved as needed by helicopter from one fire base to another with reasonable alacrity. This capability saved American lives and was instrumental in thwarting enemy attacks.

The helicopter was not without its detractors, however. It seemed to some that unit commanders often used the helicopter as an aerial command, control, and communications platform from which they surveyed the battlefield below and used radio communications to guide subordinate unit commanders on the ground. Many tacticians believed the commander's place was on the ground with his troops. Another criticism directed against airmobility was that it reduced the ability or desire of ground units to move on the ground against the enemy, fix him, and destroy him. It appeared that it was easier in the mind-set of infantry commanders to insert troops quickly, engage and defeat the enemy, and extract the American troops—only to have to repeat the same tactical process eventually. Some commanders posited the complaint that the extensive use of the helicopter in Vietnam, coupled with the noise of the aircraft, merely served as a timely warning to enemy on the ground that American troops were coming into a specific area, thereby giving the enemy time either to stand and fight or disengage and withdraw to fight somewhere else at his option. The helicopter was also assailed as being too lightly armed to withstand ground fire. This complaint begged the question of whether ground security was capable of defending disputed landing zones. Throughout the American participation in the Vietnam War, this problem was not always resolved, even when areas were softened up by close air support or supporting fire from fire-based artillery units. The NVA and the Viet Cong often tenaciously attempted to close with the helicopter-inserted infantry so as to preclude the effective use of close air support.

There is merit to these criticisms, or to what might be considered by some as cavils, but the following should be noted: the terrain, along with the tactical and political dicta of the war, precluded the use of large numbers of American troops to occupy a position on

the ground for an extended period of time. The enclave or fortress mentality, which had beset the French and had contributed to their defeat in the earlier Franco-Viet Minh War, was not a desirable option, though used somewhat by the marines at Khe Sanh in early 1968 before the Marine withdrawal in April (more on this subject later).

Since the terrain and dearth of roads favored the defender, not the attacker, movement on the ground—even with armored and artillery support—was often hazardous and time consuming. The argument certainly can be made that tactical unit commanders should be on the ground with their troops; still, the tactical fluidity of the situation often necessitated having a unit commander airborne where he could make the proper decisions based on his aerial observations of what was happening below. It was true that the helicopter was lightly armored, noisy, and could at times compromise tactical situations by these shortcomings. Yet, it must be remembered, this was an unconventional war in many ways and, as mentioned earlier, favored not the attacker, but the defender. The use of the helicopter by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps in the attack mode markedly reduced this advantage for the enemy. (8)

With the implementation of the helicopter as an instrument of war, it became imperative that the Army have a means whereby it could maintain tactical and administrative control of all its divisional and nondivisional helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft in Vietnam. It did this through the creation and use of the 1st Aviation Brigade, which served in Vietnam from May 1966 to March 1973, after which it was sent to Fort Rucker, Alabama, as a training brigade. In 1988 it became a combat aviation regiment. While in Vietnam, the brigade had under its suzerainty nondivisional aviation assets numbering at times as many as 4,000 rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft and 24,000 troops. During the war the 1st Aviation Brigade and its support units became involved in four significant tactical operations that warrant examination. (9)

The first noteworthy tactical situation in which the brigade and its units became involved was the Tet offensive of January-March 1968. In this operation the brigade responded to the precarious tactical situation wrought by the NVA's and Viet Cong's sudden incursions into major cities throughout South Vietnam. The 1st Aviation Brigade established an airborne command and control operation, while simultaneously beginning successful counterinsurgency operations that eventually drove the enemy out of the urban areas and restored the tactical status quo. This illustrated well that unit commanders did not have to be on the ground to begin offensive or countervailing action against the enemy. Doctrinally, the ground commander was to become more flexible than he had in previous wars. He therefore had a better grasp of what was happening on the ground and could move his troops quickly to where he needed them. This was effectively done to stem the Tet offensive.

The second important operation involving Army aviation units was the April 1968 orchestration of the relief effort by the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to lift the North Vietnamese Army siege of the embattled Marine base at Khe Sanh. Dubbed PEGASUS, the operation successfully combined airmobile operations and a sustained road march by 1st Cavalry "sky troopers" and Marine units to lift the siege.

The third significant operation utilizing Army helicopters in South Vietnam was the U.S. and South Vietnamese Armies' incursion into neighboring Cambodia in Mary 1970 to ferret out and destroy NVA units and their supply depots. Although a presidential order allowed troops to advance only thirty kilometers into Cambodia, the deployment succeeded in uncovering a number of large North Vietnamese ammunition and food caches. These finds subsequently were transferred back to South Vietnam, where they were either destroyed or—in the case of the food—given to local villagers.

The fourth and final important large-scale operation involving massed Army helicopters in South Vietnam was LAM SON 719 (January-April 1971). It was a combined land and airmobile, mid-intensity-level operation. The mission was the coordinated insertion of South Vietnamese troops by air and armored units into Laos to drive NVA regulars out of areas contiguous to the South Vietnamese border. American lift helicopters ferried South Vietnamese troops into Laos and helicopter gunships provided close air support, destroying a number of North Vietnamese P-76 tanks. The Army, however, suffered the loss of approximately 100 helicopters, most shot down by Soviet-built 37-mm. antiaircraft guns. Because it was monsoon season in Southeast Asia, some helicopters were lost to the pervasive inclement weather. During LAM SON 719, Army helicopter pilots were often forced to fly in what could be described as at best marginal conditions. Helicopters in Vietnam did not have tactical radar on board, so pilots had a difficult time flying during inclement weather. The fact that more helicopters were not lost during this operation was due in large measure to the pilots' flying skills and bravery. LAM SON 719 itself incurred a great deal of controversy both

UH-1B Bell (Huey) picking up 1st Air Cavalry reconnaissance troops north of Bong Son Plains, South Vietnam, June 1967.

within and without military circles as to its efficacy and results. The operation, however, served as a "lessons learned" study for the Army, in that it brought out the need henceforth to have more heavily armed helicopters in such operations, as well as attendant and better close air coordination with the Air Force and integration of supporting fire. (10)

During the Vietnam War, the Army had a number of helicopters in its inventory that played important roles. The UH-1 Huey was a multifaceted aircraft serving as a troop carrier, gunship, medevac helicopter, and cargo carrier. The CH-47 Chinook and the CH-54 Flying Crane (Tarhe) were primarily supply, lift, and transport helicopters. The Army also had two observation helicopter models that acquitted themselves well in South Vietnam: the OH-6 Cayuse (Loach) and the OH-58 Kiowa. However, the most formidable helicopter to serve in Vietnam was the AH-1 Cobra gunship, which first arrived in country in 1967. The Cobra carried 7.62-mm. machine guns, pylon-mounted 2.75-inch rocket launchers, a 40-mm. M75 grenade launcher, and an M134 minigun. It wreaked much havoc upon enemy units, equipment, and personnel during its time of service in Vietnam and is still used by the Army.

Reflections

The Vietnam War was in many ways a most imperfect war, fought by fallible men using flawed tactics; yet it was a war where battles were often brief and bloody, where tactical and logistical support often decided issues of success or failure, and where dying or living was minutes or seconds away. It was a war in which the tactical helicopter came of age and added a new dimension to warfare, that of airmobility. Though an imperfect and seemingly ungainly aircraft, the ubiquitous helicopter touched the everyday lives of the young men who fought in the harsh climate and terrain of South Vietnam. It took them into battle, provided close air support, supplied and resupplied them, and evacuated the wounded and the dead. In turn, 2,700 helicopter pilots and crewmen died during the conflict supporting their comrades on the ground. Seven helicopter pilots and crewmen received the Medal of Honor, two of them posthumously.

The Vietnam War has been over almost two decades. Its veterans, once boys and young men, are now middle aged, and most have gone on with their lives. Yet it is unlikely that any of these veterans have forgotten their images of the helicopter in Vietnam. To many, it was the first aircraft they saw when they landed in country and the last one they saw as they were leaving for home. Time and distance have blurred many memories about the Vietnam War, but one memorial to service in that conflict stands—the helicopter that served the Army well.

Since the Vietnam War the helicopter has changed, as have helicopter tactics. The gunships such as the

CH-54 Sky Crane (Tarhe) lifting a 105-mm. howitzer at a fire base in Vietnam.

venerable AH-1 Cobra and the newer AH-64 Apache are more heavily armed and now provide firepower and standoff capability heretofore not envisioned. Both of these aircraft more than proved their mettle in the recent Gulf War. Other helicopters with better lift and supply capabilities, such as the UH-60 Black Hawk, have been integrated into all facets of helicopter doctrine. Airmobility tactics, helicopter lift capability, aerial surveillance, and aeromedical evacuation techniques all have been refined to meet the contemporaneous needs of the U.S. Army. The visionaries of the 1950s and 1960s who dared to promulgate the thesis that armed helicopters had a place in military battlefield doctrine have long been vindicated, and though many of these men are no longer with us, their vision will always be remembered. Because of them the military helicopter has come of age to make the U.S. Army a more effective and responsive fighting force.

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Letters to the Editor

The letter excerpted below also was forwarded in its entirety to Dr. Heath Twichell.

Gentlemen:

I refer to the publication *Army History*...No. 27 (Summer 1993) and especially to the article "The Alaska Highway: A Forgotten Epic of World War II," by Heath Twichell....

As background, I commanded the 89th Engineer Battalion (Heavy Ponton), assigned to the CANOL task force from 1 June 1942 to late November 1942, when I was assigned as district engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, Whitehorse, the Yukon, until March 1943, when I was transferred to district engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, Dawson Creek, British Columbia, both districts under the Northwest Engineer Division at Edmonton, Alberta.

The article is...misleading....The decision to build the Alaska Highway was an emergency strategic decision made in late March 1942, when it was reasonable to believe that the Japanese could and very well might cut off "the sea lines of communication to Alaska." They could then capture Alaska as a base to employ against Canada and the United States.

Once the decision was made, it became essential that the CANOL project be built. That decision was in no way "under the impetus of 'worst case' wartime planning." The "original pioneer road" was actually 1,800 miles long from Dawson Creek, B.C., to Fairbanks, Alaska. Five-ton Studebaker trucks were deployed in November 1942 to haul essential supplies from the railroad at Dawson Creek to Fairbanks.

Shortly after the 10,000 engineer soldiers and supporting medical, quartermaster, and signal troops were deployed to build the pioneer road, the strategic planners realized that a 5-ton truck traveling 1,800 miles from Dawson Creek to Fairbanks and 1,800 miles back could carry little if any freight over and

above enough fuel to make the trip. Besides, petroleum fuel was critically short....

Wells existed at Norman Wells in the Northwest Territories on the Mackenzie River, from which a minimum of excellent quality crude oil was being refined for Canadian Pacific Airlines.

CANOL was the answer! As an example of the urgency of the project, I received secret orders on a Wednesday evening late in May 1942 to obtain a second battalion set of heavy ponton equipage from a engineer depot and to be prepared for the first of four trains needed to move my expanded battalions...at 1000 on Friday. When that first train arrived at Waterways, Alberta, the railhead pipe was already then waiting to be loaded on rafts to be constructed with the ponton equipage.

The mission of the CANOL task force was to expedite the project in any way possible, pending the arrival and mobilization of the contractor, Bechtel, Price, and Callahan. The project consisted of developing the wells at Norman Wells to produce a minimum of 3,000 barrels per day of crude oil; the construction of a 4-inch crude oil pipeline some 470 miles to Johnson's Crossing, below Whitehorse, on the Alaska Highway; the construction of a 6-inch crude pipeline some 80 miles from there to Whitehorse; the construction of a refinery with a capacity of at least 3,000 barrels of truck and airplane fuel per day at Whitehorse; the construction of 4-inch distribution lines from Whitehorse 300 miles to Watson Lake, on the border between the Yukon and British Columbia; and the construction of a 3-inch distribution line from Whitehorse to Skagway, Alaska, some 110 miles.

The "network of telephone lines" along the Alaska Highway and along the CANOL pipelines were absolutely essential to their operation.

If wartime strategic decisions were made *only* in consideration of "critics (who) questioned the projects' military value in relation to its great cost," I wonder if we would have won World War II!

I knew Mike Miletich, and in no way wish to discredit his brave and outstanding achievement at Muncho Lake! However, the statement that the Alaska Highway at Muncho Lake still follows the path of the original pioneer road is incorrect. Actually, the original pioneer road had grades as steep as 18 degrees at Muncho Lake, and trucks had to be hauled up those grades by heavy tractors.

Under my direction, and under the direct supervision of my area engineer, Lt. Col. O. J. Hughes, the highway contractor in this area relocated some twelve miles of the original pioneer road. Incidentally, this is the most beautiful area along the entire Alaska Highway.

L.E. Laurion
COL, USA, CE (Ret.)

Book Reviews

Book Review
by Stanley L. Falk

Building the Death Railway: The Ordeal of the American POWs in Burma, 1942-1945
Robert S. LaForte and Ronald E. Marcello, eds.
Scholarly Resources Books. 300 pp., $24.95

When Japanese *Sixteenth Army* forces overran and conquered the Netherlands East Indies island of Java in March 1942, their bag of prisoners included more than 600 American soldiers, sailors, and marines. Nearly all were Texas National Guardsmen from the 36th Infantry Division's "Lost Battalion"—the 2d Battalion, 131st Field Artillery—which had reached Java barely a month earlier in a vain effort to strengthen Dutch defenses on the island. The others, many of whom were also Texans, had survived the sinking of the heavy cruiser USS *Houston* in the desperate aftermath of the Battle of the Java Sea. During the forty-two months of brutal captivity that followed, most of these men, along with thousands of other Allied prisoners, spent more than a year as unwilling slaves, building the infamous Siam-Burma railway later described in the novel and movie *The Bridge on the River Kwai*.

The archives of the University of North Texas in Denton, Texas, hold the tapes and transcripts of more than seventy-five interviews with Lost Battalion and *Houston* survivors. Almost all of these interviews were conducted by Professor Ronald Marcello who with his colleague, Robert LaForte, chose twenty-two of them for publication in this volume. As edited and annotated by LaForte, they offer a dramatic and highly personalized supplement to other accounts and memoirs of the Java campaign and the Siam-Burma railway.

Readers familiar with the literature about Japan's World War II prisoners will recognize the usual pattern of cruelty, sadism, and callous indifference on the part

of the captors and of suffering, pain, starvation, disease, and death among the victims. Indeed, the experiences of the Lost Battalion and *Houston* survivors differed from that of other American prisoners of the Japanese in only two major respects: the men captured on Java were committed to a single major project over a continuous period of many months and, despite their harrowing labor, suffered relatively fewer deaths than did the others.

A staggering 40 percent of all Americans taken prisoner in the Pacific died in captivity, while those put to work on the Siam-Burma railway experienced a much lower, but no less shocking, death rate of 20 percent. The reason for this disparity was not that the latter were treated any less cruelly, but rather, probably, that they were in much better physical shape when captured than the average American POW. For one thing, they generally were younger. Even more important is the fact that almost all of the other captured Americans were taken prisoner in the Philippines, where the majority had endured three months of starvation and disease before their surrender and where half of them had barely survived a crippling Death March in the immediate aftermath of defeat.

But comparative death rates in no way diminish the horror of the Siam-Burma railway. Nor can they detract from the incredible achievement of those unfortunate captives whose tortured toil carved out a working railroad through 260 miles of steep mountains, monsoon-soaked plains, rushing waterways, and disease-infested jungles. The poignant testimony of the survivors provides a vivid sense of their unique agony.

Dr. Stanley L. Falk formerly was chief historian of the U.S. Air Force. He is the author of Bataan: The March of Death *and other books about World War II in the Pacific. He recently contributed the foreword, notes, and historical editing for* A Japanese-American Prisoner of the Rising Sun *(Denton: University of North Texas Press, 1993), the memoir of one of the few "Lost Battalion" survivors not forced to work on the Siam-Burma railway.*

Book Review
by David Hogan

America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future
by John M. Collins
Brassey's (US), Inc. 284 pp., $32.00

John M. Collins, senior specialist in national defense at the Library of Congress' Congressional Research Service, has earned considerable respect among congressmen, the professional military, and defense intellectuals for his work on defense issues. His studies for Congress, notably *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985; Green Berets, SEALs and Spetsnaz: U.S. and Soviet Special Military Operations*; and *Military Space Forces: The Next 50 Years*, have summarized for the uninitiated often complex issues in the defense debate. Now, he is using sixty case studies to evaluate American performance in low-intensity conflict, so-called small wars, during the twentieth century with an eye to future requirements in the field.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a workable definition of low-intensity conflict, but Collins seems to have come as close as anyone. Pointing out that the official definition of the term is too narrowly military, Collins has located low-intensity conflict on the spectrum between "normal peacetime competition" and high- and mid-intensity conflict of the type of World War II and Korea. Low-intensity conflict, by this definition, would include such nonviolent but abnormal activities as peace-keeping and shows of force, and would involve a variety of political, economic, technological, and psychological factors. He thereby captures the tendency of the post-World War II military to lump all forms of conflict not fitting the pattern of World War II and Korea into one vast, amorphous category, containing limited warfare, special warfare, guerrilla warfare, and innumerable other uses of armed forces in support of policy. Whether he has provided a truly useful model for low-intensity conflict is more questionable.

Having developed a rough definition of low-intensity conflict, Collins lays out its various forms and evaluates the American performance in each case. In the Collins tradition, a series of charts classifies the sixty case studies under examination by dates and duration, region, type, and the degree of involvement by American armed forces. On the whole, he finds the American record in "small wars" to be a rather spotty one, with some clear successes, notably support for guerrilla movements in World War II and the response to the Berlin Blockade of 1948, and some major failures, such as the numerous efforts to topple Cuba's Fidel Castro and the deployment of marines to Lebanon from 1982 to 1984. In many cases, the United States achieved a short-term success, only to suffer long-range consequences, as in the case of the overthrow of Iran's Muhammad Massaddiq in 1953. To improve the American record, Collins recommends such measures as more staff support for the National Security Council, a better understanding of the subject

among policymakers, and improved interservice, interagency, and international cooperation. He closes with an appendix, listing in detail the various case studies and the congressional role in each and providing a useful glossary.

Most of the criticisms from readers probably will concern Collins' classifications, particularly as to outcome. Not many, for example, would see the Mussaddiq coup as an overall success for American foreign policy. Collins understandably classifies many Soviet-American confrontations under the general rubric of the Cold War, but he does not give a clear rationale for his reasons for examining some incidents in greater detail than others. Some of the case studies in the appendix appear to have been rather hastily assembled, contain a few minor misstatements of fact, and omit important background works from their bibliographies, as in the case of the summaries on the Filipino guerrillas of World War II, Detachment 101 in Burma, the Iranian rescue mission, and Grenada. Given the scope of the author's effort, such faults can hardly be taken as major deficiencies.

In the tradition of Collins' earlier works, *America's Small Wars* is a somewhat bland but straightforward overview which summarizes the key elements of a complicated subject. Those looking for radical new interpretations or in-depth treatments of individual small wars will undoubtedly be disappointed. Still, Collins' book will prove useful on a number of levels. It approaches its subject in an evenhanded fashion—on the one hand accepting the role of low-intensity conflict as an instrument of national policy, on the other hand acknowledging the importance of popular dissatisfaction and other nonideological factors in Third World conflicts. It provides comprehensible definitions of many intricate concepts—in part through its rich glossary—and brings together a number of the strands of the American performance in low-intensity conflict in its measured, balanced conclusions. Readers will find it especially strong in its treatment of the congressional role in low-intensity conflict. As a reference work, it should aid experts and laymen alike in their efforts to grasp a subject that will concern the United States for years to come.

Dr. David Hogan is a historian in the Center's Histories Division. He is the author of U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, *and* Raiders or Lead Infantry? The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada.

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